"We are at war with Eastasia. We have always been at war with Eastasia."
As grim and depressing as I can find the automation of spam and the proliferation of bot networks, I like to think I have some perspective on the matter. For example, I recognize that there's a real danger of incredible, profound disruption from bot networks like the one that's driving the spread of the Sober.x worm[s].
But that disruption won't come from "hacking" -- most particularly, it won't come from using the bot networks to crack encryption. As usual, Bruce Schneier has cut through a lot of the nonsense that passes for wisdom on the subject.
The very idea that the main threat from bot networks is cracking is ridiculous -- it displays a basic misunderstanding not only of how end to end security systems are designed, but also some very peculiar and extremely fuzzy thinking about how to defeat those systems. You defeat the systems by gaming them, not by cracking encryption. Sure, you may want to crack encryption at some point to get through some particular locked door -- but the hard part is finding that door in the first place. And more often than not, if you're clever and you know how to game systems, you'll find that you don't need to crack encryption: You can get someone to just give you the key, or even (figuratively) open the door wide and usher you through.
Of course, it is possible, and even likely, that computers will be or even are as I write this being used to game security systems more effectively than humans can. Some clever bloke somewhere might even be writing bots that crack systems. But bot networks -- "herds" of dumb, zombified PCs, even if harnessed into a computational grid -- are more or less irrelevant to that.
Heuristics like that aren't helped by brute force. Anyone who calls himself a security expert ought to know that.
The greatest threat from bot-driven disruption is not hacking or cracking, but denial of service. The person or persons controlling the Sober zombie network alone could, should they so choose, have a significant impact on the operation of the open, civilian internet. It would be easy. It would be pointless, but it would be easy.
But again: it wouldn't be the end of civilization. We'd get by. That's what we do.
And that's the ultimate lesson of security: Unless the system is severely broken (as in Iraq after the fall of Saddam or in Rwanda in '96), people will generally act to preserve structures of civilization (as we see again and again after natural disasters throughout the world).